Hadi Hosseini
- Associate Professor of Informatics and Intelligent Systems
- Associate Professor of Economics (by courtesy)
- President of IFAAMAS
- Penn State University
- Affiliate faculty: CS Theory Group · Rock Ethics Institute
AI now makes decisions for and by a society of agents. My research asks which principles should govern those decisions when preferences conflict.
We combine the foundations of collective decision making: principled methods for aggregating diverse preferences (social choice), reasoning about strategic agents (game theory), and designing mechanisms that incentivize desirable behavior (mechanism design). We test these foundations in experiments with people, evaluate how AI agents reason and interact (AI behavioral science), and ask whether their decisions align with human values and ethical considerations (normative AI and moral philosophy).
NSF CAREER Award · Associate Editor, JAIR and JAAMAS · Associate Director, Penn State CAFE · Bio and honors
Research Focus
- AI Alignment: aligning AI with diverse and conflicting human preferences, including at inference time, by modeling alignment as a game.
- Normative Alignment: whether AI decisions and moral judgments reflect human values, where there is no single right answer.
- Multiagent Coordination: what emerges when AI agents coordinate and compete, with each other and with people.
- Fair Division and Matching Markets: what fairness and stability can be guaranteed when dividing resources or matching agents, and when they provably cannot.
I direct the Foundations of Artificial Intelligence Research (FAIR) Lab and am always looking for exceptional students. Please read this before emailing.
Research Highlights
Normative Alignment
Do AI systems share our values?
In organ allocation and resource division, language models diverge from people: they rarely hesitate, set aside responsibility, and fail to reduce inequality.
human subjectsfairness axiomsmoral judgment
AI Alignment
Can one model serve people who want different things?
We align models at inference time, without retraining, using Nash equilibria and maximin objectives from social choice.
Nash equilibriumgeneral preferencesmaximin
- Maximin Inference-Time Alignment with Diverse RewardsPreprint
- Inference-Time Nash AlignmentNeurIPS 2026
Multiagent Coordination
What happens when AI agents coordinate?
In games played by both people and LLMs, models converge on similar choices and struggle to stay diverse, even when diversity pays.
game theoryalgorithmic monocultureexperimental economics
Fair Division: Online Algorithms and Graph Structures
How can we ensure fairness in online or graph settings?
We introduce the first fairness models for groups in online matching and gig workers sharing delivery routes, design algorithms that guarantee fairness, and investigate when it conflicts with efficiency.
online algorithmsclass fairnessgraphs
- Fair Distribution of Delivery OrdersArtificial Intelligence 2025
- Class Fairness in Online MatchingArtificial Intelligence 2024
All research themes and talks, and all publications, filterable by research area. For where I think the field should go, see The Fairness Fair (AAAI 2024) and other perspectives and talks.
From Theory to Practice
MatchU
Runs fair division and matching algorithms on real problems: forming pairs, dividing resources, settling disagreements over options.
MatchXplain
Shows why a matching came out the way it did, with alternative solutions and visual explanations for the people who must defend a decision. IJCAI 2025.
SP-Rank
The first public dataset pairing people's rankings with their predictions of how others will rank, for benchmarking aggregation methods. KDD 2026. Paper and dataset →

