Principled Side Channel Vulnerability Detection and Mitigation
Side-channel attacks recover secret information by analyzing
the physical implementation of cryptosystems
based on non-functional computational characteristics,
e.g., time, power, and memory usage. Among all wellknown
side channels, cache-based timing channels are
notoriously severe, leading to practical attacks against
certain implementations of theoretically secure crypto algorithms,
such as RSA, ElGamal and AES. Such attacks
target the hierarchical design of the modern computer
memory system, where different memory access patterns
of a program can bring observable timing difference.
In this project, we systematically study how to detect and mitigate
CacheD: Identifying Cache-Based Timing Channels in Production Software,
by Shuai Wang, Pei Wang, Xiao Liu, Danfeng Zhang, and Dinghao Wu.
In Proceedings of the 26th USENIX Security Symposium,
Vancouver, BC, Canada, August 16-18, 2017.
(Acceptance rate 85/522=16.3%)