DISTRIBUTED COGNITION IN
SHARED INFORMATION SPACES
Michael
D. McNeese
Elena
Theodorou Lori Ferzandi Tyrone Jefferson, Jr.
The
Pennsylvania State University
University
Park, PA
Xun
Ge
The University of Oklahoma
Norman,
OK
This study examined
higher order perception, cognition, and individual-cultural differences as a
basis for the rapid use of knowledge in complex problems requiring distributed
team members. Previous research suggests
that when complex problem-solving teams acquire perceptually anchored knowledge
and engage in perceptual contrasts and comparisons, team members may
spontaneously access knowledge given similarly situated problems. Our premise is that perceptual anchors may
provide the basis for formulating shared mental models, which can be used to
assess situations and resolve differences in individual, unique knowledge.
However, distributed cognition settings may diminish the development of these
models despite the advantages of perceptual anchors. Because distributed cognition often incurs
through shared information spaces, this study utilized chatrooms to enact a
distributed environment. Initial
analyses partially support previous research (McNeese, 2000) that has examined
the role of cognitive processes in facilitating knowledge acquisition and
transfer. Individual problem solvers
show positive transfer but distributed team members do not. Gender and ethnicity may also impact
acquisition and transfer results. Results suggest the need for intelligent
interfaces/collaborative technologies to improve effectiveness and efficiency
in appropriating perceptual differentiation in distributed cognition.
INTRODUCTION
Cognition in the wild
(Hutchins, 1995) has been elaborated and researched as naturalistic decision making (Klein, Orassanu, Calderwood, &
Zsambok, 1993) and situated cognition (Brown,
Collins, & Duguid, 1989; Suchman, 1987). In these areas, contextual factors
produce problems that are ill-structured, uncertain, dynamic, shifting; have
competing goals, contain action/feedback loops; are coincident with time
stress, distributed across multiple players, and constrained by organization
norms and goals (Zsambok, 1997). Indeed,
as the digital global economy of this information age expands and generates
extreme complexity, knowledge workers encounter new missions that challenge how
they "put knowledge to use" both collaboratively and
individually. For example, in Naval
peacekeeping operations, we are studying the impacts of collaborative
technologies and knowledge integration tools on the effectiveness of
multi-cultural team problem solving (McNeese, 2001). This effort provides a backdrop for the study
reported here as workers engage in collaborative and individual work that is
interdependent, distributed, and often ill-defined. Teams may be composed of different
nationalities with conflictual belief systems, salient gender differences, and
at-opposition ethnicity. When teams of
this nature must work together for the good of the system but have many
inherent turbulent socio-cognitive factors, situated transfer of knowledge may
be both risky and difficult. In this
sense, these type of situations represent what we call risky cognition.
The purpose of this paper is to report initial
findings on socio-cognitive factors that impact the transfer of knowledge from
one situation to another similar situation.
Teamwork often requires team members to acquire new knowledge as they
work together to solve situated problems.
This knowledge is often put to test as team members are required to
transfer knowledge (as individuals) to similar, related tasks
(group-to-individual transfer processes) often under severe time
pressures. Some of the more salient
socio-cognitive factors that affect transfer of knowledge are establishing a
common ground of interaction through perceptual anchoring (Cognition & Technology Group at Vanderbilt (CTGV), 1993), shared mental models, metacognition,
and the technological support of work.
The Jasper Research Environment
In order
to begin study of group-to-individual transfer for situations engaging risky
cognition, we draw upon previous research involving group-to-individual
transfer in collocated settings that utilizes the Jasper-Repsaj research
paradigm (McNeese, 2000).
The selected Jasper problem (Rescue at Boone's Meadow, CTGV, 1997)
represents a research paradigm that is predicated on planning, learning, and
making decisions involving complex problem-solving tasks that initially involve
ill-defined and emergent operations. The Jasper problems are presented in a
perceptually oriented, video-based story format. They involve scenarios, event
cognition, and embedded data that enable planning and use of specific knowledge
to solve the problem presented in the video.
The goal of the Jasper series is to help problem solvers / decision
makers transform a set of given data or facts into conceptual tools that will
enable teams or individuals to solve complex problems (CGTV, 1997). The storyline-contents revolve around a
multi-step search and rescue mission that involves flight and ground
transportation elements adaptively employed to rescue life in remote
places. Contents require problem solvers
to work variations of "Distance =
Rate x Time" physics problems,
given interdependent demands of the problem context as portrayed by the video
they are presented. By establishing
subgoals and pursuing various plans that tradeoff spatial, temporal, and
practical interdependencies, an optimal answered can be derived. However, various qualities of solution can be
obtained in addition to the optimal one (as in real world satisficing). The environment may be utilized for ad hoc, first-of-kind
decision making either for group or individual problem solvers. Therein it emulates the type of problem
solving that incurs in Naval peacekeeping operations. The paradigm can also include a transfer
problem (Repsaj; McNeese, 2000). The
Repsaj problem is similar in underlying structure to
Jasper, but contains a different surface structure and a different mode of
representation (text). This creates the kind of extreme, risky cognition (in
putting knowledge to use) that is of interest. In addition to a number of performance-based
measures such as time, speed, accuracy of the solution etc., the measures
include use of problem space analysis and statement analysis as forms of
protocol analysis (CGTV, 1997) to understand how
subjects think aloud. Finally, recall measures can be
utilized to assess how much information research subjects remember from the
Jasper and Repsaj problems three days after the problem-solving session. The
Jasper-Repsaj research environment simulates characteristics involved in
naturalistic decision making and situated problem solving. One may note that teams or individuals can
solve Jasper but Repsaj is only solved by individuals. This affords creation of group-to-individual
and individual-to-individual conditions that can effectively assess the value
of socio-cognitive factors.
Many team
operations ensue with shared face-to-face interactions and are transacted in a
collocated setting. Previous research with the Jasper environment focused on
this type of setting. The collocated
setting study compared performance of 2-person problem solving dyads with
individual problem solvers for the source task (Jasper) and a successive
analogical transfer task (Repsaj) on a number of different measures (McNeese,
2000). Results indicated one key to establishing a team
cognitive process (given disparate levels of team member knowledge) is the perceptual anchor. Hence, perceptual anchors may be significant
in the formulation and development of shared mental models that oversee problem
solving.
Perceptual
anchoring. Problem solving requires both common ground
and unique individual knowledge for optimal solutions. Establishment and
articulation of a common ground with perceptual anchors is important for
quickly integrating disparate beliefs. Perceptual anchors can create a shared experience of the
problem (i.e., joint and mutually agreed upon recognition of affordances,
effectivities, and constraints that emerge from a problem context) that can
become the basis for distilling a shared mental model (McNeese, 2001). When knowledge is acquired (anchored) and
differentiated in a perceptual environment, subsequent use of that knowledge
for similar, analogous tasks or domains - without being told or informed to do
so - can be increased (CGTV, 1993).
For our previous research involving group-to-individual transfer, the
perceptual anchor was the video representation that presents the Jasper problem
as a real world, naturalistic scenario that (1) embeds all the knowledge to
solve the problem in the context of the video (2) allows problem solvers to
directly experience salient elements of the problem space. Hence Jasper is anchored perceptually in that
subjects may perceptually compare, contrast, pickup, differentiate, and
understand the problem in a natural meaningful way. Anchors have been suggested
as a foundation for communities of learning (CGTV,
1997). The results of our
previous research suggest that the perceptual anchor led to benefits for
individuals and teams; and facilitated further articulation and use of
metacognitive strategies in the collocated condition. Additionally, the results demonstrated that
working with a problem grounded in perceptual attributes resulted in specific
transfer outcomes on a novel, yet structurally similar task (Repsaj). Thus, if knowledge acquisition can be represented
in a way that highlights perceptual contrasts and comparisons, we may be able
to predict knowledge team members are likely to use on subsequent tasks.
Shared
mental models. A shared mental model may be
highly facilitated by perceptually anchored environments like Jasper, and can
create bridges of opportunity that allow access of individual unique knowledge
as part of the team cognitive process.
Shared mental models are defined as representations of information
within each team member’s mind, that are jointly held by several (if not all)
members of a team (see Endsley & Jones, 2001). Mental models allow members
to reason and predict the thoughts and possible actions of their
teammates. However, in distributed
cognition situations, the sharing that articulates and constructs mental models
for future use may be different than face-to-face situations because of
constraints inherent within communication technologies. Shared mental models may also develop
differently when team members have to overcome cultural, political, and/or
gender differences in team composition.
Initial
Assessment of Distributed Cognition
When
teamwork is distributed across remote locations and mediated by various
communication technologies, the nature of problem solving and in turn group-to-individual transfer may change
significantly. When teams are required
for globally based, international remote operations it is likely that team
members will be composed of differing ethnicity-nationalities, gender, and
ages. The combinations of these
conditions within the perceptually anchored Jasper problem create what we pose
as the basis of our preliminary study.
The purpose of the study was to explore how distributed cognition (3-person teams supported by online chatrooms) affects transfer/recall performance; in contrast to individual cognition, and control conditions. Two types of transfer will be discussed: (a) group-to-individual and (b) individual-to-individual. Additionally, this study explored individual differences (age, gender, and ethnicity) on the subjects' ability to solve problems by transferring knowledge from Jasper to Repsaj.
Expectations
are that distributed teams utilizing chatrooms, may be different from the
results of our face-to-face team research. Despite having the benefits
associated with an anchored problem, the formation of shared mental models may
be more difficult at a distance.
Group-to-individual transfer performance may decay because metacognitive
activities and shared mental models fail to form around the perceptual features
of the Jasper problem. The individual
condition in contrast is expected to maintain focus on the perceptual events of
the problem and therein show positive individual-to-individual transfer. If
transfer in the experimental conditions is significantly effective, performance
should be greater than the control condition.
However, if recall is less, the control condition performance may be
greater owing to the reduction of memory load (i.e., not having to deal with
information overload from the Jasper task).
The individual difference conditions are also an exploratory initiative
designed to perform an initial assessment on whether they might influence
performance on any of the variables (as we expect they would in multicultural
team operations).
METHODS
Participants
The participants were
240 undergraduate students enrolled in courses in a large rural university.
Thirty participants were randomly assigned to the control condition. Thirty
participants were randomly assigned to the individual condition. Ninety
participants were randomly assigned to the distributed cognition condition, and
then randomly assigned to groups of three. Note that another 90 participants
were randomly assigned to an "enhanced condition" (combination of
individual and team process), and were also randomly assigned to triads for the
cooperative part of solving the Jasper problem. However analysis of this
condition is not reported as part of this paper. A random sample of 50 transcripts (25 Jasper
and 25 Repsaj transcripts) was selected for an initial preliminary analysis
of the data.
Materials/Tasks
The tasks involved in the study included
the Jasper-Repsaj problem set. Additionally, an on-line recall task assessed
how much information students remembered from the Jasper and Repsaj problems
three days after the problem-solving session (McNeese, 2000). Subjects in all conditions had access to the
Jasper Problem via a CD-ROM at their individual computer. This provided
opportunity to go back into the perceptual-based problem to seek additional
facts and contrast scenes as part of their problem solving activities
Procedure
During the problem-solving session, the Jasper
acquisition problem was presented. Participants in the control condition did
not view or attempt to solve the source acquisition problem. Participants in
the individual condition were presented the Jasper video and solved the problem
individually. Participants in the distributed cognition condition solved Jasper
together in chatrooms after watching the video. Participants in all conditions
wrote down their thoughts while attempting to solve the problem. Next,
participants in all conditions individually read and solved the (Repsaj)
transfer problem. Finally, three days after the problem solving session
participants were sent a recall task via electronic mail. They were required to
write what they remembered from the acquisition and transfer tasks and electronically
submit their responses to the experimenters.
Preliminary
results focus on Repsaj transfer, and recall performance although significant
Jasper results are provided for individual-cultural differences. A more detailed explanation of these results
may be found in McNeese (2001). Only
significant results are reported here.
Separate
one-way ANOVAs were used on twenty-five participants’ transcripts for the
Jasper problem to first investigate whether individual differences (participant
age, gender, or ethnicity) resulted in differences on any of the dependent
measures presented in Table 1 for the Jasper problem. These ANOVAs indicated
that there were no significant differences on the dependent measures due to age
or gender differences. However, the data did show that men had a greater number
of correct details mention information (CDM) in their transcripts as opposed to
women, and that men attempted more solutions to the Jasper subproblems as
opposed to women. An ANOVA on ethnicity found significant differences across
participants on CDM, mention, attempts to solve Jasper subproblems, and
misinterpretations / confusions / recall errors (see Table 1). It should be
noted that for gender and ethnicity the number of participants in these groups
is unequal and may have influenced the results.
Separate
one-way ANOVAs revealed a significant difference between conditions on the
amount of information recalled from Repsaj three days after the research
session. Participants in the control condition remembered more information
compared to participants in the other two conditions. This may be attributable
to control condition subjects having only to remember Repsaj information;
thereby their memory load is much less in contrast to other conditions. Additionally, participants in the individual
condition remembered more information from Repsaj than participants in the
group condition. Also, participants in the individual condition solved a
significantly greater number of Repsaj subproblems, compared to participants in
the other two conditions, the results revealed a trend for participants in the
individual condition to have more correct detailed mentions of information from
Repsaj than participants in the other two conditions.
Separate
one-way ANOVAs performed on twenty-five participant’s transcripts of the Repsaj
problem were used to investigate whether participant age, gender, or ethnicity
caused differences on any of the dependent measures presented in Table 1. The results of the ANOVAs for age indicated
that there were no significant age differences on the dependent measures. ANOVA
results for gender showed that male participants attempted to solve a greater
number of Repsaj subproblems compared to female participants. Finally, the
ANOVA for ethnicity revealed nearly significant differences on two dependent
measures; number of attempts to solve Repsaj subproblems and total number of
information recalled from Repsaj three days after the session. As previously
noted for gender and ethnicity, the number of participants may have influenced
the accuracy of the results.
CONCLUSIONS
Examination
of results in lieu of expectations indicates there is initial evidence for
positive transfer performance in the individual condition. This reifies the
position that individuals get the maximum benefit from the perceptual anchoring
and likely focused on perceptual differentiation that could then be accessed on
the transfer/recall tasks. These results replicate McNeese (2000) for the
strong role perceptual anchoring has in individual cognition and subsequent individual-to-individual transfer. However, under conditions of distributed
cognition, group-to-individual transfer
does not show positive results for this study.
Because this was an exploratory condition, we believe it is likely that
even though Jasper was first viewed and experienced perceptually it is likely
that when subjects went to the chatroom they did not form shared mental models
or engage in productive metacognitive activities. One explanation is that distributed cognition
teams produce minimal contrast and comparison of different perceptual features
versus collocated teams or individuals.
Because perceptual differentiation was likely diminished, the
distributed cognition teams probably lacked a strong common ground to integrate
their metacognitive processes. These
results suggest that perceptual anchors were not well attended to as the
distributed team may expend more attention dealing with demands of remote
communication. Intelligent interfaces or collaborative technologies may be
needed to support teamwork wherein cognition can be integrated with the
perceptual features that define the context of the problem. Currently we are exploring agent-based
interfaces that function as perceptual support systems for distributed
cognition.
Our findings with respect to how individual differences / cultural
makeup could impact acquisition and transfer of knowledge are extremely
preliminary. They represent some of the first studies on how
multinational-cultural differences might effect use of knowledge individually
and in teams. The results of this study, though constrained, present challenges
that are at the heart of our research agenda.
Further studies will attempt to answer these challenges and provide a
solid understanding on how individuals use unique knowledge to share
understanding in a multicultural, multinational team working in a peacekeeping
domain.
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